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Abstract 
 
The assignment of the responsibility for different taxing powers is one of the most important problems 
in the theory and practice of fiscal federalism. The literature provides us with a set of general 
guidelines for the “tax assignment problem.” One conclusion is that “tax exporting” could create 
perverse signals for fiscal choice. In this paper the “tax exporting” problem is analyzed with simple 
models. The case of a tax passed through a referendum (Consulta Popular) in an argentinean tourist 
Municipality is studied. In a numerical exercise, using the fiscal data of the Municipality, the size of the 
public expenditures is calculated under different rules of fiscal decision. Then, an empirical analysis of 
the results of the voting and its determinants is carried out. The paper concludes with some 
comments, in order to improve the mechanisms of referendum related to fiscal decisions at the 
municipal level. 
 
 
 
 
 
Key words: direct democracy; tax assignment; fiscal externalities; tax exporting 
 
JEL classification: H 23, H 71, H72 
 
 1
I. Introduction 
  
The assignment of revenue instruments to different levels of government is one of the most 
important issues in the theory and practice of fiscal federalism. The main question is whether 
to assign certain tax instruments to a certain level of government or whether the kind of taxes 
assigned to each level is indifferent. The answer to this question embraces arguments 
related to efficiency, equity, administrative costs, and local autonomy. The literature offers 
general guidelines for the “tax-assignment problem.” For example, in local taxation, tax 
exporting should be avoided because it might create perverse signals for fiscal choice, with 
negative impact on efficiency and equity. In this paper the “tax-exporting” problem is 
analyzed with simple theoretical models (Section II) and the case of a new tax passed 
through a referendum in a tourist municipality in Argentina is studied (Section III).  In Section 
IV the final comments are presented. 
 
II. Simple models of fiscal decisions, tax-exporting and the size of public spending 
 
Tax-exporting is a process by which a locality shifts the tax burden to nonresidents. The 
study of tax exporting is of interest because it can affect, on the one hand, the taxing and 
spending policies in the exporting locality – affecting in this way efficiency-; and, on the other 
hand, it modifies the distribution of real income among localities.1 2  
 
The effects of tax-exporting over the fiscal decisions of local governments (tax structure and 
the level of public spending) depend on how the benefit of spending -which is a function of 
the collective decision rule- is affected, and on the relative cost of taxing exportable goods 
vs. domestic goods.3 This relative cost depends, on the one hand, on the rule about 
collective decisions in the locality and, on the other hand, on the tax-rate structure. 
 
In this paper we assume a tourist locality in which the local public spending (G) is financed 
with a property tax paid by the owners. These owners may reside in the locality, using the 
property for permanent housing, or they may reside in other localities, using the property as 
                                                                 
1 Whichever the level of public spending provided in the exporting locality, its real income increases because non-
residents share the total revenue of the local government.  
2 Tax-exporting is an interjurisdictional fiscal externality. These externalities arise when the decisions of local 
governments about tax and spending affect the welfare of residents in other localities (Dalhlby, 1996). These 
externalities lead to non-optimal tax and expenditure decisions if governments have biased perceptions of the 
marginal cost of public revenues and/or of the marginal benefits of expenditures. The externality arising form tax-
exporting is direct, because it affects the utility of non residents. All direct externalities are horizontal, that is, 
among governments of the same level. 
3 Income effects are not considered. Given a marginal benefit function of public spending, whether the locality 
modifies or not the level of public expenditure depends on the impact of tax-exporting over the marginal local 
(domestic) cost of public revenues. Tax exportation can also modify the marginal benefit. 
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housing in holiday periods. For the analyzed period, the total number and distribution of 
houses is fixed.4 
 
The utility -measured in monetary terms-  that consumers, residents or not, obtain from the 
goods different from housing is given by 
 
   Ui  =  Ui (ci, G)  (1) 
 
where ci is a private good and G the total quantity of a local public good. There are N houses 
in the locality; i = 1,.....R belongs to owners residing in the locality, and i = R+1,...N belongs 
to owners residing in other localities. Each person is the owner of one house from which 
he/she obtains a fixed utility that is added to that resulting from (1). It may be assumed that 
this fixed utility is higher for residents than for nonresidents because they use the house 
throughout the year. For the sake of simplification, it is assumed that housing is the only use 
for the properties. 
 
The consumer’ budget constraint is given by 
 
   yi  =  c i +  hi  (2) 
 
where yi is an exogenous income and hi is the property tax paid to the locality. It is assumed 
that the price of the private good is equal to one. The budget constraint of the local 
government is 
 
   Pg G  =  r VT  (3) 
 
where Pg is the price (constant) for a unit of G; VT is the value of the N houses in the locality 
and r is the proportional tax rate. Because there are no other sources of financing (neither 
intergovernmental transfers nor public debt), the level of the tax rate is that needed to 
balance the local budget. 
 
The property tax a person i has to pay depends on the tax rate (r) and on the value of his/her 
house (Vi); that is 
 
                                                                 
4 There is only one taxable good. This good is consumed in the taxing locality and the exportation arises because 
the owners reside in other localities. Each person demands one house, there is no selling of the stock, and there 
are no modifications of the stock. For the tax-rate structure when there are n goods with different percentages of 
consumption within the locality, see Appendix. 
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   hi  =  r Vi  =  (Vi/VT) Pg G  (4) 
 
The quantity of G to be provided depends on the collective decision rule. Let us assume the 
rule of the median voter (m) is followed.  Replacing (2) and (4) in (1) for this citizen-voter and 
maximizing we obtain, 
 
   (Ug/Uc)m  =  Pg (Vm/VT)  (5) 
 
where  (Ug/Uc)m is the marginal rate of substitution for the median voter. 
 
If the collective decision arises from a benevolent government, the function to be maximized 
is 
                    N                  N 
   W  =  å wi Ui(ci,G) = å wi Ui(yi - (Vi/VT) Pg G, G) (6) 
                   i =1                i =1  
 
wi  =  dW/dUi 
 
and the first order condition is 
             N                            N 
    Pg å si (Vi/VT) = å si (Ug/Uc)i  (7) 
            i =1                           i =1  
 
where si = wi Uci = social marginal utility of the private consumption good for the i person. 
 
If all individuals have the same weight (si = 1,2,.......N), (7) becomes 
 
 
                  N 
   Pg  = å (Ug/Uc)i  (8) 
                i = 1 
 
which is Samuelson’s rule of equalizing the price of the public good (Pg) with the sum of the 
marginal rates of substitution over all consumers. 
 
The welfare function of the local government can depart from (6) for several reasons, such 
as when the government only takes into account the benefits and costs for the R residents in 
the locality. In this situation, the welfare function is 
                   M 
   W  =  å wi Ui(ci,G)  (9) 
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                 i = 1 
 
and maximizing we obtain 
 
                            R                          R 
   Pg  å (Vi/VT) = å (Ug/Uc)i  (10) 
        i = 1                       i = 1 
 
         N                          N 
If [å (Vi/VT) > å (Ug/Uc)i], with this decision rule the costs decrease more than the 
        i = R+1                i = R+1  
benefits. This is a probable result in a tourist locality, which provokes a higher quantity of G 
than the efficient one.5 
 
An alternative for a government which only considers residents arises from the resident 
median voter (rm) preferences.  In this case we have 
 
   (Ug/Uc)rm  =  Pg (Vrm/Vt)          (11) 
This collective decision rule changes the relevant median voter and may in this way affect 
the demand of the local public good. 
 
Another model results form considering that the local government transforms the economic 
benefits into political ones, adding the political benefits arising from buying inputs in the 
locality together with the benefits of the public goods associated with G (using the previous 
case in which only the benefits and costs for residents are considered).  The idea in this 
model is that some benefits arise from the consumption of goods whereas others are 
relevant to political decisions and constitute an alternative (or complementary) measure.6 
The total benefits for a politician are the sum of those two kinds of benefits (Weingast et.al., 
1981). If the inputs are bought in the locality, the maximizing function is 
              R 
  W = å Ui(ci,G) + Pg G  (12) 
                                               i = 1                        
 
Maximizing (12) and assuming si  = 1 (i = 1,........R) y si = 0 (i = R+1, ...........N) we obtain, 
            R                                       R 
Pg  å (Vi/VT) = Pg + å (Ug/Uc)i  (13) 
     i = 1                                   i = 1 
 
                                                                 
5 Equation (10), which is comparable to (8), arises from (7) doing si = 1, for i = 1,.....R and si = 0, for i = R+1,.....N. 
6 These two approaches are different. For example, the provision of defense (D), as a Samuelsonian public good, 
benefits all the population. However, in the positive public economy, inputs become relevant; e.g. the policies of 
employment and of transfer money to the factor's owners, among others. 
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The transformation of economic benefits into political benefits is represented in (13) adding 
Pg on the side of the marginal benefit.
7 The quantity of G is higher than the efficient one 
(given by (8)), and also higher than the quantity that departs from the efficient when only the 
benefits and costs for the residents are considered (given by (10)). An interesting result is 
that in (13), for the resulting quantity of the public good, the marginal rate of substitution is 
positive, that is, the marginal utility is negative for the public good. 
 
The resident median voter can also add to the benefit of consumption of the public good, that 
she or he obtained (or hopes to obtain) from a higher direct or indirect income or from an 
externality for living in a city with less unemployment and/or better environmental conditions.  
This effect is included adding c per unit of G, so that condition (11) changes to 
 
  (Ug/Uc)m  =  Pg (Vm / Vt )  -  c  (14) 
 
In conclusion, in the median voter and in the benevolent government’ models, there is tax 
exporting but the size of the public good is not modified because exportation has an impact 
neither on the marginal benefit nor on the marginal cost of public goods for the decision 
maker. Tax-exporting can generate higher public spending than what is considered efficient 
when the decision-maker only takes into account the benefits and costs for residents. If tax 
exporting changes the identity of the median voter, it can affect the demand of the local 
public good. Besides, the size of public spending is higher when the economic benefits and 
costs are transformed into political ones –and this effect is independent of whether the tax is 
exported or not, and of whether tax-exporting originates a higher public spending or not. In 
the same way, the median voter can add the benefit obtained from higher income or from a 
positive externality to the benefit of consumption of the public good. 
 
III. Empirical results. The “Mar del Plata 2000” Plan 
 
The aim of this section is to analyze some aspects of the additional tax on property applied 
by the Municipality of Mar del Plata to finance a plan of public work.  The case is interesting 
for several reasons. Firstly, because Mar del Plata is a tourist city and the tax is therefore 
potentially exportable to other jurisdictions; secondly, because the fact that the fiscal 
package put to the vote permits the investigation of the welfare function of the local 
government (function type (1) for the median voters; type (6) for a benevolent government; 
type (9) for a local government which only considers the benefits and costs for residents; or 
                                                                 
7 In an alternative way, the transformation can be seen as decreasing of Pg. 
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type (11) for a local government which considers the benefits and costs for residents and 
also transforms these economic benefits and costs into political ones); finally, because the 
relatively small size of the fiscal package allows the use of a partial equilibrium approach.  
 
In the following sections the case is presented and the following points are investigated: 
 
(i) Which fiscal package was put to the vote? 
 
(ii) Which collective decision rule was used? 
 
(iii) Was tax-exporting possible? 
 
(iv) Which were the arguments of the welfare function of the local government? 
 
(v) Which was the impact of tax- exporting on the size of the public spending? 
 
(vi) Which was the electoral outcome and which its determinants? 
 
(i) The fiscal package put to the vote 
 
The referendum took place the 12th of May, 1996 and was the first “Consulta Popular 
Municipal”  (referendum) in Argentina.  The Yes/No question asked about was the execution 
of a plan of 25 public works, to be done in the following four years, with a total investment of 
65 million pesos (1 peso = 1 dollar).  The additional tax to finance the plan consisted in 3$ or 
4$ per month, per property, for a period of eight years.  The amount to be paid per month 
was a function of the ordinary proportional tax on property. 
 
(ii)The rule of fiscal decision 
 
The rule, included in the Municipal Law 556/96, seeks the active political participation of the 
residents in the Municipality through their opinion regarding the plan of public works “Mar del 
Plata 2000” and its financing. The electoral law establishes that the “Consulta” is to the 
residents in the city (...) who have their residences documented in their identification card.  
The conclusion is then that only residents can vote. The welfare function compatible with the 
law would be that of expression (9). 
 
(iii) The possibility of tax exporting. 
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Because the tax is levied on a fixed tax base, whose owners may be residents in the city or 
not, there exists the possibility of exporting part of the tax to other jurisdictions.  In the Plan 
Mar del Plata 2000, from the total amount of taxable properties, 61,4% belong to residents, 
who pay 64,4% of the ordinary tax and 60,8% of the additional tax (Tables 1 and 2). The 
percentage exported would be around 40%. Because the global real income in the city 
increases, the expected electoral outcome would be, under plausible assumptions, the 
approval of the proposal. For example, if the tax revenue were distributed in money among 
the residents, with no losers, the “Consulta” should always be approved (assuming that the 
total cost of the Consulta is lower than the amount exported of the tax). When there are 
winners and losers, despite the increase in the global real income of the city, it is possible 
that the Consulta may fail. The design and structure of the tax and the distribution of the 
benefits of the plan of public works are determinants of the electoral outcome.  
 
(v) Impact on the size of public expenditure 8 
 
In this section an exercise of application is presented with numerical results on the size of 
public expenditure. Basic data related to the number and the fiscal value (rateable value) of 
the properties and the additional tax for the Mar del Plata 2000 Plan were used (Table 3).  
The taxpayers are classified into residents, non-residents, and total, in order to exemplify the 
different models of fiscal decision. A cuasi linear utility function given by 
 
 
 
 
is assumed. 
 
If the median voter rule is followed, the levels of the total and per capita public spending 
(assuming ai = Pg = 1) are 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
8 We thank W.Cont who suggested this section. 
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The samuelsonian solution is 
 
 
 
 
If the rule of the median voter is followed, then the solution for the problem is 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, if the local government’s welfare function only takes into account the benefits and 
costs for residents, we obtain 9 
 
 
 
 
 
The ranking of the per capita public spending under different rules of collective decision and 
different tax structures is presented in Table 4.10 
 
With a proportional tax the size of the public spending for the resident median voter is 71% 
higher than the efficient. To apply a regressive tax structure increases the tax-price for the 
median voter and the size of the public spending is higher than the efficient in 15%. For a 
                                                                 
9 If the utility for the residents is higher than for non-residents, it is aR > aNR. If the numbers are normalized so that 
the weighted average is 1, the expression (19) becomes 
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government that only takes into account the benefits and costs for residents, the 
expenditures could be higher than the efficient from 28% to 34%, depending on the period for 
which the houses are occupied. 
 
vi) Results of the voting and their determinants 
 
In the referendum the fiscal package put to the vote not only fixed the level and the structure 
of the tax but also the size of the public spending.  In this way the endogenous variable was 
the electoral outcome.  A person i votes YES if the benefit of the public spending to him or 
her (bi) is higher than the tax burden (ci).  With the assumption of identical preferences (ai = 
1), a person votes YES if the marginal utility of the public good (1/Go) is higher than the tax-
price. Go is the size fixed by the local government and the tax-price depends on the tax 
structure. From the numerical exercise in the previous section it is known that, with a 
proportional tax-rate structure, the median voter demands a level of expenditures 
significantly higher than the efficient.  It is also higher than the level that would be fixed by a 
government looking only at the benefits and costs for the residents.11 For these sizes of 
expenditures the percentage of YES-votes applying a proportional tax structure would have 
been higher than the median.12  
 
The relatively high percentage of NO-votes (46%) must be explained. One reason might be 
the different appropriation of the benefits, with gains for the whole city but with winners and 
losers at the individual level. As it was said before, this question depends on the design of 
the plan of public works, which determines the distribution of the benefits across 
neighborhoods. The plan covered the entire city, but the works were more concentrated in 
the poorest areas. For the sake of simplification, equal per capita benefits for all the residents 
are assumed. The explanation for the relatively high percentage of NO-votes could be found 
in the tax regressivity.13  Figures 1 and 2 revel the tax structure and the tax incidence on the 
property value. As a result of this tax structure design, 56,4% of the properties paid an 
additional tax of 6$ every two months (those properties that paid 30$ every two months as 
ordinary tax)  -representing 19,8% of the ordinary tax but 49,3% of the additional tax. For 
residents these percentages are, respectively, 59,7%, 21,1% and 52,2%.  For non-residents 
the percentages are 51,3%, 17,6% and 44,2%. These data are enough to revel the 
                                                                 
11 To the results in Table 4 one should add the effect that the plan of public works and/or the externality from living 
in a city with better environment could have on the budget constraint of the median voter. 
12 Median voters demand in this case an expenditure 61% / 71% higher than the efficient (Table 4). All the voters 
with marginal utility between the provided quantity (from a benevolent government or from a government looking 
only at residents) and that of the relevant median voter are YES-voters. 
13 The tax-regressivity was put forward for several political groups and neighborhoods. For example the local 
Union Labor wrote off a statement called “the 12th, YES to the plan of public works; the 13th, equitable taxation” 
(the 12th refers to the day of the referendum, 5-12-1996). 
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regressivity of the tax and this regressivity might have decreased the quantity of YES-votes, 
bringing it to the median.  An additional evidence about regressivity arises from considering 
the additional tax in different neighborhoods and comparing it with the ordinary tax (Table 
5).14  In the three richer neighborhoods the additional tax was equivalent to around 10% of 
the ordinary tax, with the percentage growing to 62% in the poorest areas. In the following 
section an econometric analysis is carried out in order to analyze the determinants of the 
electoral outcome.   
 
vii) Estimations of the determinants of the electoral outcome 
 
To analyze empirically the determinants of the results of the “Consulta Popular”, the city was 
divided in the neighborhoods defined in the electoral law. The main explanatory variable 
according to the previous section is the tax-price. We use several control variables -the 
choice limited for the availability of data. These variables are the economic level of the zone, 
the kind of occupancy of the properties, the productive structure and the number and sex of 
the residents. The economic level of the neighborhood is measured through a variable 
indicating the average level of education (weighted average of years of education at different 
levels) and the per capita value of the cars (quantity of cars weighted for the average-year-
model). It also includes a variable representing the percentage of poor people (the 
percentage of people with unsatisfied basic needs (UBN) related to the percentage of non-
UBN people). Regarding the occupancy of the properties, a variable considering the 
percentage of non-owner to owners is used. The productive structure is approached by the 
(per capita) number of commercial and service shops in the neighborhoods.  
 
For the econometric estimation a standard minimum least squares regression was used. The 
dependant variable is the percentage of YES-votes divided the percentage of NO-votes. 
 
The results of the estimations are reported in Table 6. As expected, the coefficient of 
average education, variable proxy of income and property value15, is positive.16 The richer 
                                                                 
14 The tax regressivity might have had stronger effects than the concentration of the public works in zones IV to 
VI. 
15 There is conclusive evidence about the positive relationship between education level and labor income. For 
Argentina (Gran Buenos Aires area) see Gasparini et.al. (2002); for the United States, see Card and Krueger 
(1996). According to Bahl and Linn (1992), there is no clear consensus on the income-elasticity of demand for 
housing in developing countries, but there are good a priori arguments that it will not be less than unity. In this 
paper it is assumed that education (average education in the neighborhood) is a proxy for both income and 
property value. 
16 The positive sign can also reflect positive income elasticity and better information about the benefits of the 
proposal for the most educated people. 
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neighborhoods with lower tax-prices due to the regressivity17 have more percentage of 
approval of the Consulta.18 
 
If the average education were the only determinant of the electoral outcome, the coefficient 
equal to 0,17 (models (a) and (b) in Table 6) would imply that in a neighborhood with an 
average education of incomplete primary education (3 years and half) the proposal would 
have been defeated by 62,5 % of the voters. In the other extreme, in a neighborhood with an 
average of complete college education, the proposal would have been approved by 75 % of 
the voters.  The relative labor income between these extreme educational levels is 3,7 times 
(Gasparini et.al, 2002), and the same rank would correspond to property value if the elasticity 
property value-income were the unity.  The tax price would be lower for the group with high 
value properties in 64% and considering non-labor income this difference would be higher. 
Consistent with these calculations, in Table 5 the difference is about 84 %. 
 
The coefficient for the relative percentage of people with UBN is not different from zero. This 
result can be explained as a consequence of two opposite forces: on the one hand, this is 
the group of people who can benefit more from the job creation of the plan and this argument 
was put forward when the proposal was being sold to the people. But, on the other hand, it is 
the group that was relatively more hurt by the regressivity. The characteristic of the 
occupancy of the properties (owners, tenants, free occupants) is significant. In the 
neighborhoods with more people not legally obliged to pay for the tax, the YES answer got a 
higher percentage of votes. This would indicate that, in the short run at least, the tax was not 
shifted to the rental payments or to the persons who were living in the houses for free (free 
rent). The relative quantity of commercial and service shops was expected to have a positive 
impact on the YES-votes. The explanation of this is that if the public works attract more 
tourists, the benefits could be higher for its neighborhoods. The coefficient was not 
significant. The composition by sex did not influence the electoral outcome despite the 
expectation that due to employment opportunities, the neighborhoods with higher proportion 
of men would have more YES-votes. 
 
The participation of residents in the Consulta was not obligatory. The percentage of residents 
who voted was around 48% of the residents that were legally able to vote. Because the 
                                                                 
17 The net benefit is higher (lower) in the richest neighborhoods because the size of the public spending is fixed 
(Go) and everyone obtains the same marginal utility (1/Go), but for the properties of higher value the tax-price is 
lower (higher). With a proportional tax-rate structure the tax-price is Vi/V -an increasing function of Vi (¶(Vi/V)/¶Vi = 
1/V > 0). With a regressive tax-rate structure the tax-price is a/Vi where a is a constant defined in a way that åa/Vi 
= 1. This tax-price decreases with Vi  (¶(a/Vi)/¶Vi = - a/Vi2 < 0). 
18  The same sign was obtained for the average per capita value of the cars in the neighborhood, as proxy of 
income and property value, but the level of significance was lower. 
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percentage of voters varied significantly among neighborhoods, it was included as 
independent variable in model (d); the coefficient is not significant and this result constitutes 
evidence for the fact that the variability of voters by neighborhood did not have an influence 
on the electoral outcome. To further investigate the problem of selection bias in the sample, 
Heckman’s procedure was used. Due to the lack of microdata to investigate this aspect in 
detail, it was assumed that in those neighborhoods where the percentage of residents who 
voted No was higher than a standard deviation there could exist bias selection. The results of 
the regression can be found in column (e) in the Table; the coefficients, signs and 
significance of the explanatory variables are similar to those in columns (c) and (d). 
 
IV. Final comments 
 
Tax exporting is a process by which a locality (e.g. a municipality) shifts the tax burden to 
nonresidents. The effects of tax exporting over the decisions of a local government (tax 
structure and the level of public spending) depend on how the benefits of the expenditures 
are affected, and on the relative cost of taxing exportable vs. domestic goods. 
 
In this paper only one taxable good (real property) is considered. The owners who paid for 
the tax may reside in the locality or not. The tax paid by nonresidents is exported to other 
jurisdictions.  Several models of fiscal decision are presented and the possibility that tax 
exportation affects the level of public spending is analyzed.  In the median voter and in the 
benevolent local government models there is tax-exporting but the size of public spending is 
not modified.  Tax exporting may influence the public spending size when the decision-maker 
only takes into account the residents or when it changes the identity of the median voter. 
 
In the “Mar del Plata 2000 proposal” the percentage of tax-exporting would reach 40%.  
There is evidence of a local government considering only benefits and costs for residents.  
The collective decision rule permitted that only residents could vote. 
 
In a numerical analysis, using explicit cuasi-linear utility functions and the data of Mar del 
Plata city, the size of the public expenditure was calculated under different rules of collective 
decision and different tax-rate structures. Had a proportional tax-rate structure been applied 
to the value of the properties -similar to the property tax the municipalities apply in order to 
finance their ordinary budgets-, the ranking of the size of public spending would have been 
the following: the highest size for the resident median voter, then the median voter in the total 
population, then that arising from a rule in which only residents account for both benefits and 
costs, and finally the efficient (Samuelsonian) size. The size for the resident median voter is 
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over 70% higher than the efficient one. The choice of a regressive tax-rate structure 
increased the tax price for the median voters and in this way decreased the size of the 
project -although it remained 15% higher than the efficient one. 
 
The “Mar del Plata 2000” contains a more complex proposal than that of the numerical 
analysis because the fiscal package put to the vote fixed not only the tax-rate structure but 
also the size of the public spending.  In this context, the endogenous variable is the electoral 
outcome. Assuming a size for the public spending equal to or lower than the efficient, then 
the percentage of the YES-votes under a proportional tax-rate structure would be higher than 
the median. It is hypothesized that the regressive tax-rate structure decreased the amount of 
YES-votes and moved it near to the median. A standard regression was run to test the 
determinants of the voters’ choices in the referendum using data from almost seventy 
neighborhoods in the city. The estimated coefficients have the expected sign and are 
statistically significant. The more wealthy neighborhoods had more YES-votes indicating a 
lower tax-price due to tax-regressivity. The percentage of YES-votes increases with the 
number of tenants in the neighborhood -they can vote but, at least in the short run, they do 
not pay for the tax. The poorest people could, on the one hand, be hurt by the tax-
regressivity but, on the other hand, could be benefited by job creation -as it was put forward 
when the proposal was sold to the people; the coefficient is not significant indicating the 
probable compensation of these two opposite effects. 
 
Finally, some comments about using the “Consulta Popular” for fiscal choices at the local 
level follow. The rule for collective decision is of importance in the problem of tax exporting. 
The issues of local employment and local level of economic activity are not out of concern of 
these units of government. The design of the tax rate structure is a determinant of the 
electoral outcome. An interesting question in the Mar del Plata 2000 Plan is why the Mayor of 
the Municipality, who had won the election a few months before, put the fiscal package to the 
vote instead of passing it in the ordinary way fixed in the Provincial Constitution and in the 
Provincial Law of Municipalities. The point of the Mayor might have been that he did not want 
to violate the commitment assumed with the population about increasing taxes. Perhaps 
another reason could be that certain interest groups found in the “Consulta Popular” a way to 
pass their proposal of public spending and its financing. This is an open question not 
investigated in the paper (for the foundations of the popular initiative, see Besley and Coate, 
2000).  A good news with the Mar del Plata 2000 referendum was that, in a country 
accustomed to predatory governments, a door was open for the direct participation of the 
people. The benefits of the political participation (one of the values in the organization of the 
public sector) can be divided into three categories: instrumental, to ensure that the 
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government maximizes aggregated welfare; educational, for individuals to learn that their 
private interests are linked to the interests of others; and direct consumption benefits for 
those who participate (Inman and Rubinfeld, 1997; Frey, 1997).  The “Consulta Popular” was 
good despite its wrong design in several aspects (especially regarding who was allowed vote 
and the tax-rate structure -among others). Some suggestions to improve the mechanism 
arise from the results of this paper. About the fiscal decision rule, restricting the possibility of 
voting only to residents was a poor decision, especially considering that changing the identity 
of the median voter would not affect the electoral outcome significantly.  About the tax-rate 
structure it was one of the most debatable factors and one that determines the result. Finally, 
a negative aspect is that the additional tax implemented through the referendum was recently 
transformed into a permanent tax, this time without voting, in violation of the original 
commitment. 
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Table 1 
Tax structure 
Voted tax Number of properties Semimonthly tax revenue of 
pre-existing (ordinary) tax  
Additional semimonthly tax 
revenue of voted tax 
  (U$S) (U$S) 
Residents 
Semimonthly payment U$S 6 132,090 1,763,471 792,540 
Semimonthly payment U$S 8 89,324 6,595,567 714,592 
Total 221,414 8,359,038 1,507,132 
   
Non-residents 
Semimonthly payment U$S 6 71,588 812,290 429,528 
Semimonthly payment U$S 8 67,894 3,812,810 543,152 
Total 139,482 4,625,100 972,680 
   
Total  
Semimonthly payment U$S 6 203,678 2,575,761 1,222,068 
Semimonthly payment U$S 8 157,218 10,408,377 1,257,744 
Total 360,896 12,984,138 2,479,812 
Source: Based on data from General Pueyrredón Municipality (1996). 
 
Table 2 
Tax structure 
Percentages 
Voted tax Number of properties Semimonthly tax revenue of 
pre-existing (ordinary) tax   
Additional semimonthly tax 
revenue of voted tax 
 
Residents   
Semimonthly payment U$S 6 36.6 13.5 31.9 
Semimonthly payment U$S 8 24.7 50.8 28.8 
Total 61.3 64.3 60.7 
   
Non-residents 
Semimonthly payment U$S 6 19.8 6.2 17.3 
Semimonthly payment U$S 8 18.8 29.3 21.9 
Total 38.6 35.6 39.2 
   
Total  
Semimonthly payment U$S 6 56.4 19.8 49.2 
Semimonthly payment U$S 8 43.5 80.1 50.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Based on data from General Pueyrredón Municipality (1996). 
 16 
 
 
Table 3 
Mean and median of the distributions* 
 Residents’ properties Non-residents’ properties  Total 
    
Pre-existing (ordinary) tax 
Total number of properties 221,414 139,482 360,896 
Total revenue (U$S) 8,974,930 5,037,280 14,012,210 
    
Mean (U$S) 40.53 36.11 38.83 
Median (U$S) 22.65 28.25 24.05 
    
Voted tax 
Total number of properties 221,414 139,482 360,896 
Total revenue (U$S) 1,507,132 972,680 2,479,812 
    
Mean (U$S) 6.81 6.97 6.87 
Median (U$S) 6.00 6.00 6.00 
* See Figures 3 to 5 
Source: Based on data from General Pueyrredón Municipality (1996). 
 
 
Table 4   
Size of the per capita public spending under different rules of fiscal decision and different tax structures 
Rule of collective Per capita public spending  Per capita public spending  
decision with proportional tax-rates with regressive tax-rates 
 (pre-existing (ordinary) tax) (voted tax) 
   
Median resident 1.7144 1.1450 
   
Median total 1.6145 1.1450 
   
Benefits and costs for 0.9580 a 1.2821 1.0088 a 1.3417 
residents*   
   
Benefits and costs for 1 1 
residents and non-
residents 
  
(Samuelson)   
* The lower values correspond to aR = aNR = 1 (expression (19)); the higher values correspond to aR > aNR (aR = 1.5; aNR = 0.25; 
assuming that the utility depends on the period of occupancy of the houses. E.g. if NR people occupy the houses for two 
months and R people for all the year, we have aR /aNR = 6). 
Source: Based on Table 3 
 
Table 5   
Average tax (pre-existing and voted) per neighborhood*  
Neighborhoods  Average pre-existing 
(ordinary) tax 
Average voted tax (2)/(1)*100 
 (1) (2)  
   
I 75.70 7.53 9.90 
II 66.80 7.66 11.50 
III 57.00 7.46 13.10 
IV 36.10 6.81 18.90 
V 24.60 6.40 26.00 
VI 9.78 6.04 61.80 
   
Mean 45.00 6.98 23.53 
Standard deviation 25.68 0.67 19.65 
* Correspond to the first payment in the year 2000 for residents.  
Source: Based on data from General Pueyrredón Municipality (2001). 
 
 17 
 
Table 6     
Explanatory variables Dependant variable: percentage YES/percentage NO 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
    
AE  0.17 0.17 0.20 0.21 0.21 
 (1.78)*** (1.72)*** (1.99)** (1.76)*** (1.91)** 
UBN 0.05 0.02 0.05 -0.003 -0.10 
 (0.20) (0.10) (0.19) (-0.012) (-0.45) 
NO-O 0.56 0.61 0.85 0.71 0.98 
 (2.90)* (2.92)* (3.19)* (2.38)** (3.04)* 
Population  -2.51e-06 -8.88e-07 -1.47e-07 -2.50e-06 
  (-0.69) (-0.19) (-0.30) (-0.48) 
MW   -0.23 -0.23 -0.34 
   (-1.40) (1.29) (-0.52) 
CSp   -3.37 -2.89 -4.00 
   (-1.17) (-0.89) (-1.06) 
V    0.19  
    (0.14)  
Constant 0.69 0.70 0.86 0.89 0.91 
 (3.83)* (3.85)* (3.82)* (3.60)* (1.36) 
Selection      
      
AE      0.18 
     (0.17) 
UBN      
      
NO-O     1.64 
     (0.46) 
Population     -5.19e-05 
     (-1.58) 
MW     -2.60 
     (-1.40) 
CSp     -2.97 
     (-0.09) 
Constant     3.11 
     (1.60) 
Number of observations 66 66 66 61 61 
R2 adjusted 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.15  
Chi2     24.21 
Log Lik     -5.29 
Rho     0.96 
Sigma     0.20 
Lambda     0.20 
t test between parenthesis in regressions (a) to (d) (* 1 % significance; ** 5 % significance; *** 10 % significance); z test in 
regression (e) 
 
 
Description of variables and data sources 
 
Dependant variable 
Percentage of YES votes/percentage of NO votes. 
 
Source: Newspapers "La Capital" and "El Atlántico", Mar del Plata, 1996. 
 
Independent variables 
AE: average education: weighted average of years of education at different levels 
UBN: unsatisfied basic needs: percentage of population with unsatisfied basic needs/ percentage of population 
without unsatisfied basic needs  
NO-O: no-owners: percentage of renters and free occupants/percentage of people living in their own properties 
MW: percentage of men/percentage of woman 
CSp: number of commercial and service shops/population 
V: number of voters/population legally able to vote 
 
Source: Basic data from the Municipality of General Pueyrredón.     
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Figure 1 
Structure of the additional tax 
(semimonthly payment - U$S) 
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Figure 2
Incidence of the additional tax on property value
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Figure 3
Taxation on residents
Frequency distribution of the value of residents' properties
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Figure 4 
Taxation on non-residents
Frequency distribution of the value of non-residents' properties
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Figure 5
Total taxation (residents and non-residents)
Frequency distribution of the value of total (residents and non-
residents) properties
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Appendix 
Cuasi-optimal tax-rates on goods 
 
 
Several models of taxation lead to the same formal expressions for the cuasi-optimal tax-rate 
structure on goods. Be qi the consumers’ prices, pi the producers’ prices and ti = qi-pi the tax 
on the good i. It is assumed independent demands and no income effects. To minimize the 
excess burden, the tax-rates as percentage of the final price are given by 
 
ti = (m -l /m) (1/hi)   i = 1,....n (A1) 
 
where m is the marginal cost of the public funds in terms of utility, l is the marginal utility of 
the private income and hi is the price-elasticity of demand. Expressions (A1) are the Ramsey 
rule. 
 
For an exportable good and a politician considering only the cost for residents, the 
expressions are 
 
ti` = (m -l qir /m) (1/hi)   i = 1,....n (A2) 
 
where qir is the share of domestic consumption (Gordon, 1983; Wildasin, 1987). The higher 
the tax exportation (lower qir), the higher the tax-rate. Hettich and Winner (1984) develop a 
model in which the tax-rate structure arises from the minimization the political cost of taxation 
in terms of lost votes. Tax exportation decreases the political cost and determines that the 
taxes on exportable goods have an important share in total tax revenue. The expressions for 
the tax-rates are 
 
ti`` = (m - ki /m) (1/hi)   i = 1,....n (A3) 
 
where ki is the marginal cost of the public revenue in terms of lost votes.  The higher the ki, 
the higher the political cost.  And this political cost is decreasing with the exportation of the 
tax. 
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